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“Shall I Tell You What Soqotra Once
Was?”
World Heritage and Sovereign Nostalgia in Yemen’s Soqotra Archipelago
Nathalie Peutz
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Cet article est également publié en français das ce même numéro.
1 In January 2011, during the same week that the climactic ousting of longtime Tunisian
President Zine El Abine Ben Ali captivated the globe and catalyzed the subsequent wave
of  revolutionary demonstrations and protests  throughout  the Arab world that  would
come to be referred to as “the Arab Spring,” in Soqotra, the largest and most populated
island of Yemen’s Soqotra Archipelago, pastoralists and town-dwellers alike had been
expressing  to  me  their  anxiety  about  Soqotra  gaining  a  measure  of  political
“independence.”1 Having recently heard that the archipelago was to soon be governed by
an island-wide “Socotra Authority” (Ar.: hai’a) – a condition of its having been recognized
by UNESCO as a “natural” World Heritage Site in 2008,  but having only begun to be
established through the Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project, a joint Government
of  Yemen  (GoY)  and  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  initiative  –
Soqotrans  were  vocally  grappling with the  meaning of  this  new form of  “local”  but
nevertheless  supranationally-mediated  sovereignty.  Indeed,  Soqotran  friends  and
acquaintances whom I had known since 2004, but whom I had not seen since my previous
return visit to Soqotra a year prior, were eager to discuss what many of them considered
just  another  and  yet  more  concentrated  extension  of  the  kind  of  “transnational
governmentality”2 they had experienced from 2001-2008 when the former UNDP project,
the  Socotra  Conservation  and  Development  Programme,  had  acted  as  the  de  facto
governance  structure  on  Soqotra.  Their  skepticism,  moreover,  was  buoyed  by
uncertainty: what would this Authority do? Who would “own” it? And why couldn’t the
archipelago be designated a [conventional] Yemeni governorate (Ar.: muhâfaza), instead?
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Soqotrans, at the start of the “Arab Spring,” it seemed, were asking for more state control
or, at least, for less transnationally-regulated “autonomy.” What could this mean?  
2 For the past fifteen years, Yemen’s Soqotra Archipelago has attracted a disproportionate
amount  of  state  funding  and  international  aid  earmarked  for  conservation-and-
development programming aimed at conserving its exceptional biodiversity.  Not only
have  these  ascendant  projects  transformed  Soqotra’s place-in-the-world  –  from  a
relatively  obscure  and  seasonably  inaccessible  Indian  Ocean  island  to  a  “globally”
recognized World Heritage site – but also they have sought to transform, through zoning
technologies and pedagogical persuasion, every inch of its territory as well. This article
examines Soqotran responses to their island’s environmental and political enclavization
by focusing on Soqotran anxieties with regard to the proposed new governance structure,
which  many  viewed  as  just  the  latest  form of  several  visitant  regimes  having  been
imposed  upon  them by  outside  forces,  and  Soqotrans’  oft  expressed  nostalgia  for  a
Schmittian form of sovereignty – one ruler, personified and indivisible – as opposed to
the “shared” or “overlapping” sovereignty that, in practice, attenuates their own political
access and cultural independence. This exploration of Soqotra’s political transformation
enables  us  to  reframe their  questions  above  in  slightly  broader  terms,  to  ask:  what
transformations in state sovereignty emerge in the transnational governance of spatial
enclaves set apart for their globally-significant “nature” or “culture,” or “heritage”? In
order to approach this question, let us first consider the topology of modern sovereign
(state) power.
 
Enclaves, and the Topology of Sovereignty
3 Scholars  have  long  argued  that  sovereignty  and  territoriality,  once  considered
theoretically coterminous with one another, have become increasingly uncoupled by the
“global” circulations of capital, bodies, and ideas3. Yet, this apparent disarticulation of
(state) sovereignty and (national) territory has not prevented them from continuing to
explore the spatiality of sovereignty, its performances and its effects. On the one hand,
this renewed interest in sovereignty and its “spatializing practices”4 may stem from the
capacious scholarly and popular use of “globalization” as a spatialmetaphor illustrating
how states and nations are being besieged by the planetary spread and expansion of
transnational  nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs),  international  corporations,
multinational agencies, global capital, and restless bodies. Indeed, this metaphor is so
very powerful  that  even its  correctives  offer  spatial  alternatives;  for  example,  James
Ferguson who convincingly argues that “the ‘global’ does not ‘flow’ […]; it hops instead”5
nevertheless draws our attention to the “spatial enclaving”6 that globalization engenders.
On the other hand, the national identity and security crises fomented by increasing (or
“illegal”)  migratory  movements,  the  events  of  September  11,  2001,  and  the  ensuing
“Global  War  on  Terror”  have  shifted  scholarly  attention  to  both  the  fortification  of
political borders and the spatial quarantining of “foreign” migrants, refugees, and asylum
seekers7.  Much  of  this  literature  has  been  influenced  by  political  theorist  Giorgio
Agamben’s conceptualization of the constitutive relationship between sovereign power
and bare life, the banned and abandoned “sacred” life (homo sacer) that is included in the
politico-juridical order only by virtue of its exclusion8,  and his related analysis of the
modern “state of exception” through which the suspension of the law in times of crisis
has created “a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations –
“Shall I Tell You What Soqotra Once Was?”
Transcontinentales, 10/11 | 2011
2
and  above  all  the  very  distinction  between  public  and  private  –  are  deactivated”9.
Agamben’s  own  reliance  on  distinctly  spatial  metaphors  –  the  zone  of  indistinction
between inside and outside, exclusion and inclusion, exception and rule; the threshold of
indeterminacy between anomie and law, logic and praxis, democracy and absolutism; the
(concentration) camp as the localization of the state of exception – has inspired many of
his readers to look for today’s “homo sacer” or “state of exception” in “negative” spaces
of exclusion, like internment camps, detention centers, and border zones, a point I will
return to shortly. 
4  These two broad strands – the examination of overlapping sovereignties and scattered
enclaves, and the inquiry into sovereign exception and spaces of exclusion – converge in
Aihwa Ong’s work on “neoliberalism as exception”10.  With a nod to Carl Schmitt, who
famously defined the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception”11, and a narrow
reading  of  Agamben’s  treatment  of  the  (sovereign)  exception  as  applying  solely  to
“excluded” groups who are denied legal protections, Ong posits the (neoliberal) exception
as “an extraordinary departure in policy that can be deployed to include as well as to
exclude”12. In Ong’s formulation, neoliberalism as exception describes the state’s calculative
use of market-driven interventions in countries where neoliberal (market-based) policies
are not the norm with the aim of optimizing a specific group’s marketable skills or a
select area’s global competitiveness. At the same time, exceptions to neoliberalism may be
deployed by liberal states to “exclude populations and places from neoliberal calculations
and choices,” whether for the purpose of “protecting social safety nets or for stripping
away all  forms of political protections” for noncitizens13.  Together,  Ong argues, these
neoliberal exceptions – neoliberalism as exception and exceptions to neoliberalism – are
reconfiguring  the  relationship  between sovereignty,  territory,  and  citizenship  within
national boundaries and beyond; for example, citizenship-like benefits may be extended
to  mobile  individuals  valued  for  their  expertise,  while  being  retracted  from citizens
without  such  human  capital.  Although  the  neoliberal  exception  does  then  produce
exclusions  of  various  kinds,  Ong  endeavors  to  direct  our  attention  primarily  to  the
“positive” exceptions:  the “neoliberal  decisions” that,  Ong argues,  “have created new
forms of  inclusion,  setting apart  some citizen-subjects,  and creating new spaces that
enjoy extraordinary political benefits and economic gain”14. These spaces include special
economic, administrative, developmental, ecological,  “technopreneurial,” and “expert”
zones – that is, enclaves – subject to diverse degrees of the “overlapping,” “graduated,” or
“variegated” sovereignties that emerge from the amalgamation of (formal) state rule and
(de facto) corporate-, multilateral-, or NGO-governance of the territory.
5 Ong’s work is thus extremely useful for framing and interrogating an environmental,
developmental, and heritage enclave like the Soqotra Archipelago, which, since the late
1990s, has been progressively demarcated as a “space of exception”15 while at the same
time being increasingly encompassed,  politically and administratively,  by the Yemeni
state16. In 1996, the still newly unified Government of Yemen ratified the Convention on
Biological  Diversity,  declared  Soqotra  “a  special  natural  area  in  urgent  need  of
protection”17, and commissioned the EU-funded Master Plan for the development of the
Soqotra Archipelago. These actions and interests opened the door to the implementation
of  several  UN-managed integrated conservation and development  projects  (ICDPs)  in
Soqotra:  the  Socotra  Biodiversity  Project  (1998-2001),  which  focused  heavily  on
biodiversity  research  and  documentation,  and  was  extended  until  2003;  the  Socotra
Conservation and Development Programme (2003-2008), which worked more specifically
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on community development and its integration with biodiversity conservation; and, in
2009, the Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project (2009-2013),  which is currently
“mainstreaming”  biodiversity  management  on  Soqotra  by,  in  part,  establishing  the
island-wide  Authority  mentioned  above.18 These  projects  (hereafter  referred  to,
collectively,  as  the  ICDP),  which  were  funded  at  different  stages  by  multilateral
organizations  such  as  the  Global  Environment  Facility  and  the  United  Nations
Development  Program  and  bilateral  donors  such  as  the  governments  of  Italy,  the
Netherlands, and Yemen, along with several small grants from other bilateral donors and
transnational NGOs earmarked for specific sectors, will have injected over sixteen million
dollars during this fifteen-year period into the “conservation” and “development” of the
archipelago. This may seem like a paltry amount, but given the anemic state of Soqotra’s
local governance structure – which, since the passing of Yemen’s “decentralizing” Local
Authority Law in 2000, consists of two local district councils with nominal resources and
minimal  fiscal  control  –  it  was,  in  many cases,  the ICDP which served as  the  proxy
government  on  Soqotra.19 Indeed,  Soqotrans  often  viewed  the  ICDP  –  or  “the
Environment” (Ar.: al-bî’a) as they called it – as the island’s (newest) regulatory regime. 
6 Soqotrans were thus introduced and made subject to a palpable form of “shared” or
“overlapping” sovereignties, under which “the state retains formal sovereignty, [while]
corporations  and  multilateral  agencies  frequently  exert  de  facto  control  over  the
conditions or  living,  laboring,  and migration of  populations in special  zones”20.  Such
overlapping sovereignty in special zones results not only or primarily out of territorial
conflicts between sovereign states and quasi-state authorities or from a state’s inherent
“weakness,”  but  also  and  increasingly  from  the  state’s  own  neoliberal  decision  to
temporarily  relinquish  control  over  areas  attractive  to  international  investment  and
expertise21. In other words, overlapping or shared sovereignties develop in the spaces or
enclaves that emerge when states deploy what Ong terms a “graduated sovereignty,”
adjusting their  governmental  techniques  and rule  over  varied areas  and populations
according to the dictates of the global market22. Applied to the Soqotra Archipelago, Ong’s
argument illustrates how the Yemeni state – which has been regularly depicted as being
“weak,” “fragile” or “on the verge of collapse” by policy makers and pundits, and even by
the Soqotrans who lament its “retreat” – may have been deliberately implementing a
policy of  “graduated sovereignty” with regard to this  enclave whose internationally-
funded  “eco-development”  substantially  secures  its  greater  political  and  economic
integration within the Yemeni nation-state. 
7  Fundamental to Ong’s concept of “graduated sovereignty” are the zoning technologies
and strategies deployed by sovereign states to facilitate these gradations in governance.
“Zoning technologies” demarcate certain spaces within the national territory in order to
profit from their specific characteristics and setting while also establishing transnational
connections between such sites, thereby creating “an archipelago of enclaves”23. For Ong,
these “zoning technologies” are examples of the “positive” exception that not only create
opportunities  (for  some),  but  also  could  represent  “an  economic  detour  leading  to
broader political integration”24. In Soqotra, one of the first and greatest accomplishments
of the ICDP was the drafting and implementation of the conservation Zoning Plan, ratified
by Presidential Decree in 2000. Under this plan, which mapped the entire archipelago into
five  categories  of  natural  resource  management  and  conservation  –  resource  use
reserves, general use zones, national parks, areas of special botanical interest and nature
sanctuaries – every meter of Soqotran territory was defined and demarcated spatially (by
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maps  and  through  signboards  posted  at  the  geographical  borders  between
areas)according  to  its  increasing  or  decreasing  “conservation”  or  “development”
potential. Indeed, the very “nature sanctuaries” which were required to be preserved “in
as undisturbed a state as possible”25 were soon tapped and targeted for global ecotourism,
their  “protection”  a  promise of  profit.  Moreover,  it  was  this  widely  celebrated  but
nevertheless  practically  unfeasible delimitation  of  spaces  and  “their”  appropriate
activities that eventually paved the way to the archipelago being recognized by UNESCO,
in 2003,  as a Man and Biosphere Reserve and being inscribed,  in 2008,  on the World
Heritage List. Yemen’s Soqotra Archipelago, once one of the country’s most impoverished
and isolated regions,  had thus found its  place among the planet’s  most privileged of
archipelagos: globally marketable and networked World Heritage sites.
8 As  applicable  as  Ong’s  formulations  here  are,  it  will  be  helpful  to  return  briefly  to
Agamben’s theorization of the exception, which Ong characterizes solely as a “negative”
exclusion,  but  which  Agamben  defines  more  broadly  as  a  “zone  of  indistinction”26.
Although Agamben’s  concept  of  the  “state  of  exception”  is  perhaps  most  cited  with
regard to the internment “camp” – a space that Agamben describes as “the fundamental
biopolitical paradigm of the West”27 – he also identifies the exception in at least two other
arenas: (1) in the burgeoning medical indistinction between biological life and death and
(2) in the enduring development imperative to eradicate the distinction between “the
People” as political body and “the people” who are poor and needy by eliminating their
exclusion28.  It  is  in  Agamben’s  admittedly  brief  treatment  of  “the  people”  and their
“development”/exclusion that we might find a hint of what Ong would call a “positive”
exception. But is it really a question of which exceptions – which exclusions or enclaves –
can  be  deemed  “positive”  or  “negative”  ones?  Or  would  we  then  not  be  missing
Agamben’s larger point, borne out by Ong’s own examples, that the exception is always
inclusive: a way of capturing bare life or “the people” within the political order through
their very exclusion? If this is true, then Ong’s claim – that by temporarily ceding its full
sovereignty over its “bankable” enclaves, the state ultimately may be able to integrate or
encompass them more broadly29 – would seem less novel or even “positive.” Enclaves are
by definition inclusive  exclusions:  zones  of  indistinction between inside  and outside,
exception and rule. It is important to remember, then, that Agamben’s own description of
such  spaces  is  not  topographical,  but  topological,  identifying  “thus  not  so  much  a
spatiotemporal  suspension  as  a  complex  topological  figure  in  which  not  only  the
exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside,  pass
through  one  another”30.  Given  this  essential  structure of  the  state  –  or  space  –  of
exception, the enclave is more analogous to the camp than one at first might think. 
 
 “A World Apart”
9 In March 2005, an American employee of the United States Embassy in Sana’a visited one
of Soqotra’s newly established protected areas (according to the Zoning Plan, a “nature
sanctuary”)  in  which the ICDP had set  up a  rudimentary campground.  This  and the
growing number of ICDP-funded campgrounds on the island were the project’s version,
and vision, of what Paige West has called “conservation-as-development”31,  their goal
being to attract and accommodate international “ecotourists” whose expenditures would
fund the local communities’ conservation-driven “development.” Having been informed
by her tour guide about the area’s impressive level of botanical diversity and floristic
“Shall I Tell You What Soqotra Once Was?”
Transcontinentales, 10/11 | 2011
5
endemism – the Soqotra archipelago boasts 307 (or 37 %) endemic species, seven of which
are native to this protected area alone – the embassy employee reflected on her initial
confusion upon arriving on the island. “We are used to talking about endemic corruption
and  endemic  poverty;  we  talk  about  this  everyday,”  she  told  me,  referring  to  the
problems plaguing Sana’a and the rest of mainland Yemen. “So I was surprised to come
here and hear everyone talking about ‘endemic’ in a positive sense,” she laughed. She was
surprised, in other words, to find in Soqotra the exception. 
10 Long before tourists started visiting its protected areas or before these zones had been
mapped out – long before the archipelago had been rendered an “enclave” – Soqotra had
been characterized as both an exceptional place and a place of exception. Valued in early
antiquity for its aromatic resins and aloes, Soqotra entered the historical record through
the Roman historian Pliny the Elder (5th century BC) as the origin of the sacred phoenix;
through the Greek historian Diodorus of Sicily (1st century BC) as a utopist commune; and
through the anonymous Greek author of the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea (1st century CE) as
an exotic emporium of great reptiles, tortoise shells, cinnabar and frankincense. Arab and
European historians writing in the Middle Ages, including al-Mas’ûdî, Marco Polo, and
Ibn  Battuta,  reported  on  its  astonishing  Christian  population,  and  their  notorious
reputation as pirates and sorcerers32. Although Soqotra had fallen under Mahri (South
Arabian) control by the mid-fifteenth century and continued to be ruled by the Mahra-
based Bani ‘Afrar sultans until 1967, Portuguese colonizers managed to occupy it briefly
from 1507-1511.  Their  chroniclers  were enchanted by  the traces  of  Christianity  they
encountered there, as were the later Christian missionary visitors to Soqotra, including
St.  Francis  Xavier  and  St.  Ignatius  of  Loyola,  who  followed.  Even  then,  signs  of
Christianity on the island had become regarded as a curious relic, with Soqotrans as their
primeval  custodians.  For  example,  in  1541,  Portuguese  admiral  Dom  Joao  de  Castro
admired the Soqotrans’ vestigial devotion and similarity of spirit  – “Socotrans revere the
Gospel. […] have the same names as we have, Pierre, Jean and Andre; the most common
name for their women is Marie. […] Almost all of them wear crosses” – while noting also
their radical, animalistic difference: “They live like wild beasts, without any political life
or  legal  organization”33.  In  short,  Soqotra  was  long represented as  a  place apart:  an
Edenic garden, an outpost of marooned Christians, a home to mythology and magic, and a
place of danger and degeneration. 
11 If early chroniclers were most captivated by Soqotra’s exotic nature, then later visitors
seemed especially taken by the notion of the Soqotran as a noble savage: a charming
likeness of their own pre-civilized (or post-degenerate) selves. After the archipelago had
reverted to Mahri rule, the next maritime power to briefly “colonize” Soqotra was the
British, which nominally “governed” Soqotra as a British Protectorate from 1886 to 1967.
In 1834, twenty-six year old Lieutenant J.R. Wellsted led a scouting expedition to Soqotra
to determine its viability as a coal depot for the British Indian Navy (five years later, the
British  Government  occupied  and  settled  Aden  instead).  Wellsted  was  intrigued  by
Soqotra’s “primitive” yet peaceful mountain-dwelling “aborigines” (or “Bedowin”) whom
he greatly preferred to the “zealous” and “indolent” coastal-dwelling “Arabs”: “Tall, with
strong, muscular, and remarkably well-formed limbs, a facial angle as open as that of the
Europeans…[the Bedowin are] a remarkably good looking people, distinct and removed
from any of the varieties of the human race seen on the shores of the continent on either
side”34. More than one hundred years later, Douglas Botting – who similarly at the young
age of  twenty-two led an expedition to Soqotra,  this  one “scientific”  –  expressed an
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analogous  fascination  with  the  autochthonism  and  distinction  of  Soqotran  Bedouin.
“Until now, the Bedouin of Socotra have been among the most isolated and least known
people  in  the  world,”  Botting  writes,  engrossed  by  the  idea  that  they  might  be  the
descendants of the “original inhabitants of Arabia,” yet disdainful, nevertheless, of their
“strange,  poor,  primitive  life”35.  Yet,  for  Botting,  it  is  the  Soqotran  Bedouin’s  very
“isolation” that renders him less noble than primitive. Describing a Bedouin’s “fearful,”
“dirty” existence – an existence that elsewhere in the text he describes as “a world cut off
from the rest of humanity for countless centuries, hemmed in, absolutely remote and
unreal,  living  out  its  own  strange  and  incommunicable  life”36 –  Botting  casts  the
“Bedouin” as an unworldly troglodyte: “He had always been there, he would always be
there,  he  knew  of  no  other  world,  he  was  interested  in  no  other  world”37.  Similar
conjectures about the Soqotrans’ radical insularity and apartness continue to be voiced
today.  For  example,  contemplating  the  Soqotrans’  ostensibly  provincial  lives,  a  U.S.
journalist visiting Soqotra writes, “I was tempted to ask our guide, if he could travel, what
in the world he wanted to see. But I refrained; the question would have meant nothing to
him”38.  Soqotran  “Bedouin”  need  not  read  Burdick’s  recent  travel  essay  –  with  the
somewhat predictable byline, “the prehistoric island of Socotra is a world apart” – to
know that they are considered not just isolated, but also insular. They do not need to read
these or other sensationalist accounts39 of their alleged stagnation because they decipher
it already in the gifts sent to them by their émigré relatives living in the prosperous Arab
Gulf States, in the visits of their foreign-born nephews who clearly consider their Arab
upbringing and education superior to that of their Soqotran relatives, in the language of
various  “training”  courses  and  “awareness”  campaigns  implemented  by  European
students in their early twenties, and in the photographs that tourists frame. The trope of
noble-savage – today, unworldly indigene – remains ever so alluring, despite the various
transnational connections and communities grounding the majority of Soqotrans’ lives40. 
12 Although many Soqotrans do believe that their island is, by its very nature, “exceptional,”
they would thus likely take issue with its  (and their)  ostensible “apartness,” arguing
instead that Soqotra is, in fact, at the very center of the world. Indeed, it is through this
perspective  that,  until  1967,  the  Bani  ‘Afrar sultans  constituted  their  territory  and
delineated the threshold of the Soqotran community, using their sovereign privilege to
ban thieves and witches from the islands to the continental hinterlands of the Arabian
Peninsula. And yet, with its gradual encompassment by the Yemeni state – starting in
1967 with the claiming of the archipelago by South Yemen’s National Liberation Front
and accelerating in the late 1990s and early 2000s under the “unified” Republic of Yemen
–  this  center-periphery  perspective  was  reversed  as  the  respective  states  executed
policies that hinged on the archipelago’s geographical and symbolic detachment from the
mainland. Under the socialist regime of the People’s Democractic Republic of Yemen, the
Soqotra archipelago was governed as a “military zone of restricted access”41, obstructing
not only the travel of Soqotrans from the islands, but also the departure of the mainland
citizen-prisoners who had been banished to Soqotra to there live out their sentences and
lives. While this “state” of exception was lifted in the early to mid 1990s under the unified
regime, it was soon replaced by the reconfiguration of the archipelago as a “place” of
exception, effecting its swift transformation to “enclave” from “camp.” It is not, however,
simply its “exceptional” nature (literally) that defines Soqotra as a place of exception, but
rather its topological restructuring as a “place” both inside and outside the Yemeni state
and its law. Free of the wide-ranging political and social conflicts that have bedeviled
much of mainland Yemen (and absent of the weapons, too), Soqotra, as it is now defined,
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is  well  placed  to  (re)capture  the  international  tourism  and  capital  fleeing  Yemen
“proper.”42 In  other  words,  despite  the  U.S.  employee’s  lexical  confusion,  her  initial
bewilderment reveals much more; Soqotra, the site of endemic flora, is showcased by the
state as a screen to the endemic conflict and corruption “at home.” As Soqotrans are well
aware that  the archipelago’s  geographical  and symbolic  “apartness”  functions as  the
inclusive  exclusion  that  only  facilitates  its  broader  economic  and  political
encompassment by the sovereign state, their skepticism regarding the newest governing
exception – the proposed “independent” Soqotra Authority – is not that surprising, after
all. It is to this exception that we now turn.
 
Conceiving the (Soqotran) Exception
13 Despite  Soqotra’s  recent  but  precipitous  “opening”  to  domestic  immigration,
international  development,  global  environmentalism,  global  tourism,  and  the  world
heritage industry, the archipelago continues to be characterized, as noted above, as other
worldly, forgotten, and virtually unreachable: as Yemen’s “ultimate frontier”43. It is as if,
even or  especially  now –  with its  protected area  status  –  Soqotra  “had a  protective
barrier”; and yet, as in other “remote” areas, “from the inside outwards, there was an
almost  exaggerated  contrary  sense  of  the  absence of  any  barrier  to  the  world  –  a
particular  sense of  excessive vulnerability,  of  ease of  entry”44.  As  if  to highlight  this
vulnerability,  this  exposure,  Soqotrans  tend  to  narrate  their  political  history  as  a
periodization of entries or incursions: first the Sultans “entered,” then the British, then
the  Party  (i.e.,  the  socialist  regime),  and  then al-wahda(the  post-unity  government).
Moreover, it is not only these political entries that are counted as foundational shifts or
junctures. Like the succession of states that are said to have entered Soqotra min rinhem
(Soq.: from [across] the sea) – or rather, as the flotsam and jetsam that washed up on its
shores, as it were45 – the more recent ICDP “entries” are often characterized by Soqotrans
as invasive, as well: invasive and visitant. That is, in Soqotra, this sense of “ease of entry”
is accompanied by a distinct awareness of the ease of departure, too. States, regimes, and
projects have come and gone. In the meantime, however, Soqotrans are called upon to
“host” these various ventures “from the sea” and continue to do so tentatively with the
conviction that another regime or project – potentially better or worse that the current
one – will inevitably arrive someday and take its place.
14 It is with this sense of apprehension that my former Soqotran neighbors, friends and
acquaintances were discussing, in early 2011, the proposed establishment of the “Soqotra
Authority.”  Three  years  earlier,  in  an attempt  to  bolster  its  bid  for  Soqotra’s  World
Heritage Status, the Government of Yemen endorsed five cabinet decrees prescribing the
improvement  of  the  conservation and development  of  the  archipelago.  One of  these
decrees  called  for  the  establishment  of  a  “national  entity  responsible  to  plan  and
coordinate  all  developments, investments  and economic  activities”  pertaining  to  the
archipelago to “ensur[e] the achievement of the sustainable development of the Socotra
Archipelago,  while  conserving  its  unique  environment,  biodiversity,  and  natural
landscapes that are the basis for its WHS nomination”46. Within a week’s time, the UNDP
and  two  European  ambassadors  to  Yemen  drafted  letters  affirming  their  continuing
support of the ICDP’s work in light of this new governance structure.47 This move toward
creating a special, “independent” authority in Soqotra to “facilitat[e] the continued and
expanded collaboration among all relevant agencies of the Government of Yemen, and
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the international community” – especially in “technical and financial terms”48 – must
have convinced the World Heritage committee of the government’s commitment for, in
July  2008,  the  archipelago  was  declared  a  World  Heritage site.49 That  same  month,
representatives of two government ministries and the UNDP signed off on the current
GoY-UNDP project, the Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project (SGBP). Aiming to
ensure that “biodiversity management considerations are mainstreamed effectively into
the  current  process  of  ‘decentralizing  governance  for  development’  on  the  Socotra
archipelago,”  the  SBGP’s  first  and  primary  task  is  to  support  the  development  and
implementation of  the island-wide Authority.  The fact  that Soqotrans were animated
about this in 2011 – and not, for example, in 2010 when I visited, too – has a lot to do with
the SGBP’s delayed progress; although the SGBP officially commenced its work in June
2009, it had virtually no presence on the island until the spring of 2010 and, even by early
2011, it had not yet run workshops informing Soqotrans of their plans. Soqotrans were
speculating, though. Would the al-hai’a (the Authority) be just an extension of al-bî’a
(the  Environment,  e.g.,  the  ICDP)?  (The  “Environment”  was  fine,  my  interlocutor
hastened to assure me, albeit “a little lacking” [Ar.: nâqis shwayya] in its development
outcomes.) Would it be under the dominion (Ar.: mulk) of one person or tribe? And who
would select the five people they had heard would constitute its governing body?
15 From an  “eco-development”  perspective,  the  Soqotra  Authority  made  good  sense.  It
would be the “positive” – dare I  say,  “neoliberal” – exception to Yemen’s normative
governance  structure  through  which  the  bulk  of  the  “planning,  budgeting  and
implementation  responsibilities”  are  maintained  at  the  regional  (governorate)  level,
which operates and mediates between the central government and Yemen’s 333 local
districts50. Currently, Soqotra’s two local councils must vie with 29 other regional districts
for support and services from the Governorate of Hadramawt, the largest of Yemen’s
twenty-one governorates. The proposed Authority, in contrast, would be authorized not
only to oversee all conservation and development activities on the island, but also to
liaise  directly  with  the  central  government  while  receiving  and  managing  the
international donor monies given to the Soqotra Archipelago. Modeled after the Aqaba
Special  Economic  Zone  Authority,  “an  administratively  and  fiscally  autonomous
institution responsible for the management, regulation and development of the [Aqaba
Special Economic] zone,”51 the Soqotra Authority/Special Zone would similarly work to
capture  global  capital  within  Yemen’s  national  boundaries  and  state  territory52.
Moreover, it would also benefit the international community, providing, according to the
SGBP document, the “UNDP with an opportunity to pilot the newly consolidated local
governance  structure”53.  Instead  of  being  an  “independent”  or  even  local,  “Soqotri”
institution,  then,  the  Soqotra  Authority  would  merely  facilitate  the  more  effective
deployment of the “shared sovereignty” negotiated between the GoY, UNDP and UNESCO
already during the earlier stages of the ICDP.
16 From many Soqotrans’ perspective, however, the proposed Authority represented a step
away from strong,  centralized and presumably effective rule.  Hamdan, a middle-aged
pastoralist living in one of Soqotra’s protected areas, stated that he and other Soqotrans
would prefer that the archipelago be redistricted as Yemen’s twenty-second governorate
so  that  all  of  its  allocated  state  and  donor  funds  would  reach  its  elected  council(s)
directly. Although his desire for a streamlined disbursement is in fact one of the rationale
for establishing the Soqotra Authority, Hamdan suspects that – under this new, externally
implemented and conceivably still-“visitant” regime – the moneys allocated to Soqotra
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would continue to be “eaten” (embezzled) along the way. Marwan, another middle-aged
pastoralist,  reiterated Hamdan’s concerns that the Authority – in his eyes,  simply an
extension of the ICDP – would continue to “eat” from the funds allocated to Soqotra as (as
many Soqotrans believe) the ICDP did, as did the state offices and bureaucrats standing
between  the  central  government  or  the  international  donors  and  the  local  district
committees. And yet, more specifically, Marwan preferred that the archipelago become a
territorially integral muhâfaza (governorate)instead of an administratively exceptional
hai’a(authority)  so  that  in  Soqotra  more  government  –  as  opposed  to  privatized  –
employment opportunities would arise; “there would be a lot more teachers hired and
more projects and more help from the government,” he surmised. In other words, in his
eyes, if Soqotra were to be governed in a normative sense – not as an exception – then the
government would actually have to step up and strengthen its social safety net, rather
than abandon the archipelago to the vicissitudes of these visitant and,  now, market-
governed  regimes.  While  it  may  be  true  that  their,  and  other  Soqotrans’,
apprehensiveness regarding the proposed Authority was based not only on its alleged
extrinsic and transient form, but also, in large part, on the general lack of communication
between the SGBP and the community – leading Soqotrans to speculate about rumors and
foment their worst fears – their concerns were based also legitimately on their post-
socialist  experiences  of  the  “eating”  and  simultaneously  “retreating”  state.  This
“exception”  –  the  suspension  of  state  subsidies,  welfare,  and  employment  –  has
engendered a widely shared nostalgia in Soqotra for a time in which the archipelago was
not yet governed by this neoliberal rationale.  
 
Sovereign Nostalgia
17  “Shall I tell you, or not, what Soqotra once was?” Othman Abdullah Othman Baidobah
asked the  all-male  crowd of  men and young adults  pressed into  the  primary school
courtyard. It was the opening night, in December 2008, of Soqotra’s first public and now
annual poetry contest, “The Festival of the Soqotran Poet,” a metacultural performance
that features contestants from around the island voicing their oral compositions in front
of the audience and a panel of “expert” judges. “Shall I tell you,” Baidobah began, before
launching into his vivid verse on “the past,” a verse that would contribute to him being
named the “Poet of Soqotra” in 2008. Baidobah went on to describe a time familiar and
dear to most everyone in the audience, even the large majority of school-aged boys who
remember this “once” only through narratives such as his: This was a past when there were
no roads in Soqotra, or even proper schools, he continued; when Soqotrans had no rice or (basic
imports like) tomato paste, not to mention radios or tape recorders; when there was no electricity
and there were no airplanes landing in Soqotra; when Soqotrans depended solely on their livestock
or on the fruits of the sea; when they slept (in caves and) on goatskin rugs; when they had no plates
but rudimentary clay vessels and stones; and when they relied on cauterization or herbs (in place
of pharmaceuticals). And, yet, this was a time, Baidobah declared, when God acted upon the
people; when the Soqotrans would pull each other into their houses insistent on slaughtering their
best goats for one another; and moreover, when there was only one leader, who had the last word,
as opposed to today’s climate of clientage and corruption.
18 My  rather  liberal  rendition  of  Baidobah’s  poem  notwithstanding,  two  widely-held
Soqotran perceptions punctuate what is otherwise a litany of hardship. The first is the
memory of generosity and hospitality, in spite of such adversity. This was a time in which
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Soqotrans perceive themselves to have had less and yet to have, themselves, given more:
a  clear  indictment  of  the  present  emphasis  on  market-driven  “development”  and
“modernization” projects. The second is the memory of the al-Afrari Sultanate of Mahra
and Soqotra that ended in 1967, the “one leader” being an explicit reference to the last
Sultan, Isa bin Ali (d. 1976), a Carl Schmittian ideal type of sovereign: the “sole architect,”
personified and indivisible54. His was a period of authoritarian and even autocratic rule,
and  yet,  the  Sultan  is  nevertheless  perceived  as  having  been  “one  of  us”:  a  clear
indictment  of  the present-day “unity” government  fractured by patronage networks,
corruption, and northern Yemen domination. 
19 It may be tempting, and would not be entirely inaccurate, to read this dual perception –
of a past governed by unconditional hospitality and by a singular, decisive sovereign – as
an expression of structural nostalgia.55 Yet,  what my conversations with Soqotrans in
January 2011 lead me now to believe is  that theirs may be better termed a sovereign
nostalgia: the nostalgia for a non-graduated, unshared sovereignty embodied in the
autonomous host – the host who is sovereign in his own home – as in the sole (sovereign)
Sultan.  This  sovereign nostalgia,  expressed not  only in Baidobah’s  poem,  but  also in
several other poems presented during the 2008-2011 contests, is not just past-oriented.
That is, it articulates a longing not so much for a return to Soqotra’s era of despotism and
deprivation as it does a longing for a decisive, pastoral state in the present. In other
words, sovereign nostalgia is a rejection by Soqotrans of the “shared” sovereignty that
dilutes  the  state’s  accountability  and  obscures  their  access  to  it,  while  maximizing
international involvement in their affairs and accelerating their encompassment by the
(still) sovereign state. 
 
Conclusion
20 As recently as fifteen years ago, the Soqotra Archipelago was inaccessible for five months
of each year because of the southwest monsoon that sweeps across its shores and “locks”
the sea. This state of semiannual isolation – a seasonal recess, not a temporal rupture –
changed dramatically with the “discovery” of the archipelago as a biodiversity “hot spot”
and the subsequent “opening” (Ar.:  infitâh) of Soqotra, its largest and most populated
island,  to new forms of  economic liberalization and environmental  regulation.  Albeit
sponsored  by  the  Government  of  Yemen,  these  changes  were  implemented  mainly
through a multilateral integrated conservation and development project (ICDP), which,
between  1997  and  2008,  sought  to  transform the  entire  archipelago  into  a  national
protected area supported largely by international ecotourism, and between 2009 and the
present, aims to establish the archipelago as a whole as a special administrative zone
governed by an independent Soqotra Authority. As a result of these initiatives, UNESCO
recognized the Soqotra Archipelago as a “natural” World Heritage Site, a move that many
Soqotrans have perceived as their territory being appropriated by the global community
with an explicit and narrow concern for its biodiversity, but not for the preservation of
their distinct cultural heritage. This territorial appropriation has not resulted in their
dispossession  by  multinational  corporations,  as  has  been  occurring  in  places  like
Indonesia where rural communities have been displaced by logging companies56, and is
grounded in the preservation rather than the exploitation of Soqotra’s natural resources.
Nonetheless,  Soqotrans  have  similarly  been  experiencing  a  form of  the  increasingly
globalized shared sovereignty that benefits both governments and international actors,
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but  is  rejected  by  the  Soqotrans,  themselves.  If  Soqotrans  express  nostalgia  for  an
individual,  decisive  sovereign,  this  does  not  imply that  they simply long for  a  more
authoritarian state or that they support the current instantiation of the Yemeni regime.
Indeed, in Soqotra, too, there were demonstrations in the late spring and summer of 2011
calling for the departure of President Ali Abdullah Salah. What many Soqotrans do desire
is their political inclusion in a strong, pastoral state characterized by good governance
and accountability toward all  its citizens.  In this,  they reject also their enclavization,
which,  in delineating and marketing their “apartness,” ultimately renders them even
more vulnerable to and restrained by supranational forces “from beyond the sea.”
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RÉSUMÉS
In January 2011, during the same week that the fervent revolts against multiple Arab regimes
captured global attention, in Soqotra, the largest and most populated island of Yemen’s Soqotra
Archipelago,  pastoralists  and  town-dwellers  alike  were  anxious  about  their  island  gaining  a
measure of political “independence.” Having recently heard that the archipelago was soon to be
governed by an environmental Authority  – a condition of its having been recognized by UNESCO
as a World Heritage Site in 2008  – Soqotrans were grappling with the meaning of this new form
of  “local”  but  nevertheless  supranationally-mediated  sovereignty.  For  the  past  fifteen  years,
Yemen’s  Soqotra  Archipelago  has  attracted  a  disproportionate  amount  of  state  funding  and
international  aid  earmarked  for  conservation-and-development  programming.  Not  only  have
these ascendant projects transformed Soqotra’s place-in-the-world  – from a relatively obscure
and seasonably inaccessible Indian Ocean island to a “globally” significant World Heritage site  –
but also they have sought to transform, through zoning and pedagogy, every inch of its territory
as well.  This essay examines Socotran responses to their island’s environmental and political
enclavization by focusing on (1) Soqotran anxieties with regard to the proposed new governance
structure, which many viewed as just the latest form of several visitant regimes imposed upon
them  by  outside  forces,  and  (2)  Soqotrans’  expressed  nostalgia  for  a  Schmittian  form  of
sovereignty  – one ruler, personified and indivisible – as opposed to this “shared” sovereignty
that, in practice, attenuates their own political access and cultural independence. It argues that
such « sovereign nostalgia »  is   rejection by Soqotrans of  the increasingly  globalized form of
« shared » sovereignty that dilutes the state’s accountability and obscures people’s access to it,
while  maximizing  international  involvement  in  their  affairs  and  accelerating  their
encompassment by the (ever still) sovereign state.
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